THE CASE FOR LEGAL CONTROL OF "LIBERATION"
PROPAGANDA
Gmuiu VON

GLAHN*

The presentation of a case for control of so-called "liberation" propaganda requires,
initially, an examination of the nature and legal status of this form of activity. With
such a foundation, it will then be possible to evaluate such controls as already exist
and proposals for additional controls. In order to keep this analysis within reasonable
bounds, the inquiry has been restricted to propaganda emanating from governments,
thus leaving aside similar efforts by private individuals and by groups below the
level of national political groupings in single-party states such as the Soviet Union.
"Liberation" propaganda has as its object the arousal and abetment of tendencies
toward an outbreak of revolutionary violence in another country. The purpose of
such violence may be assumed to be the creation of radical domestic changes, such as
a termination of colonial status, the elimination of legal racism, the ending of "neocolonialism," or simply the replacement of one governing elite by another. Liberation propaganda is thus connected most intimately with the manifested inability of
the existing world community to legislate peaceful change. Since ruling elites in
many instances are opposed to the coming of such change, a situation is created in
which outside assistance appears to be necessary or desirable to effect the change.
Again, since what might be termed rebellion of the mind must precede rebellion by
arms, liberation propaganda occupies a vital position in the forcible production of
domestic change.'
Liberation propaganda is a phenomenon of considerable antiquity. Writers are
in general agreement that the first modern example of government-sponsored propaganda in favor of liberation movements was the decree voted by the French National
Convention on November 19, 1792.2 Basically, however, it is our own century that
has witnessed the rise of liberation propaganda to the status of a common tool in
foreign policy. This development, representing deliberate mass production of treason,' has been stimulated, on the one hand, by the relative stalemate in nuclear
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weaponry on the part of the two superpowers and, on the other hand, by the advances
recorded in the sphere of mass communications, coupled with a considerable and
effective increase in national efforts to create subservient organizations in other
4
societies in this age of what Scott has termed "informal penetration."
While any nation, large or small, possesses the ability to disseminate liberation
propaganda, internal revolutionary situations have most often tended in recent years
to become the battlefields in the Cold War. Liberation propaganda has therefore
become identified, wrongly, with the conduct of that conflict. In reality, it is an integral part of covert political warfare.
Liberation propaganda falls under the more general heading of subversive propaganda,5 centering as it does on communications intended to bring about the transformation of an existing internal political order through revolutionary activities.
Subversive propaganda may be subdivided into a number of categories such as "ordinary" subversive propaganda, irredentist propaganda, and social-revolutionary propaganda, with considerable overlapping among these being likely in most situations.0
Liberation propaganda appears to fit most comfortably into the social-revolutionary
group. It represents, therefore, a mortal danger to any target government, for it
seeks to dissolve the basic cement of loyalty that binds a citizen to his government and
to his community. This very characteristic, on the other hand, creates the attraction
which the utilization of this form of propaganda exerts on governments anxious to
bring about the replacement of a governing elite in another state or territory.
If treason is presented as a higher, more desirable loyalty, if existing bonds among
citizens are attacked by appeals emanating from outside sources, then any ruling
elite would be hard put to point to a more direct and eroding attack on the foundations
of its society.7 A government faced by outside attempts to foment civil strife, class
war, and subversion will try to defend itself by all means available, not excluding war,
to avoid its own extinction or radical transformation. It is this characteristic of liberation propaganda-its purpose of seeking to undermine the loyalty of citizens and
thus the nation-state itself-and the consequent danger that retaliatory measures
will unleash a larger conflict which underlie the argument that controls over such
propaganda must be established among members of the community of sovereign
states.
Space does not permit, unfortunately, a detailed examination of actual state practice in the sphere of liberation propaganda. It should be pointed out, however, that
while Western commentators have been prone to emphasize Communist and AfroAsian liberation propaganda activities, the fact is that most major nations, including
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the United States,' have made use of the device in the pursuit of national policies,

particularly after the Second World War. On the other hand, the bulk of liberation
9
propaganda has emanated from Communist states, with the Soviet Union and mainland China,'" the chief practitioners of this Machiavellian art.

The Russian attitude toward wars of liberation appears to be founded on two
basic contentions: it is asserted that every colonial (and now "neocolonial") area

acquired its status, by definition, as the result of specific acts of aggression on the
part of the colonial or neocolonial power involved; in the second place, it is maintained that in direct consequence of that original aggression, no matter when undertaken, the area affected possesses a right of "retribution," that is, of resistance in the
name of self-defense against the "aggressor."" Regrettably, the Soviet interpretation

of an inherent right to rise against a colonial government was buttressed by the
adoption, in 196o, by the United Nations General Assembly of a "Declaration on the
12
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.'
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The Russian view is, furthermore, that support should be extended to rebellious
colonial populations by the members of the Socialist bloc. But such support should
always be given only within the "limits of acceptable risks," that is, without running
into the danger of a major military conflict with the "aggressor state." On the other
hand, no corresponding Western right to "export counterrevolution" is granted in the
Soviet doctrine. In other words, the Western states should not support any party in
8
an internal or local war which opposes the group supported by socialist states.
As far as the duty of nonintervention is concerned, the usual Communist formulation has always deviated widely from the actual and necessary practice of states in
their international relations. (It should be pointed out, parenthetically, that the Socialist myopia in this respect has been shared frequently by Latin American states.) Typically, "any direct or indirect intervention under any pretext in the internal or external affairs of another state" is alleged to be forbidden under the generally accepted
norms of international law.' 4 But such a formulation cannot be accepted as realistic.
States are bound to be concerned about and to attempt to influence policies of other
states, and unless a given country could somehow manage to live in isolation, to do
otherwise would not even be considered to be desirable. No rule of international
law has ever denied the right of a sovereign state to try to affect the external policies
of other states. All that has been attempted has been the development of rules
designed to assure that such activities do not interfere with the equality under law of
all independent states.
The best guide to current Chinese Communist attitudes on subversion and subversive propaganda is the major doctrinal article by Marshal Lin Piao, Chinese Minister of Defense, that appeared in all major Chinese newspapers on September 3, 1965.
Marshal Lin asserted that the United States "colossus" could be defeated on a piecemeal basis by the outbreak of "people's wars" in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and
that nuclear retaliation would be prevented by American fears of the resulting international condemnation of nuclear war. Marshal Lin then contended that the Maoist
theory of revolutionary conflict-the use of rural bases as the points from which urban
centers held by an enemy should be attacked-should be adopted as the basic global
strategy through which world Communism could be attained. In other words, "liberation wars" in Africa, Asia, and Latin America should be utilized to "encircle" the
Western ("urban") centers of power. He continued:
[T]he greatest fear of U.S. imperialism is that people's wars will be launched in
different parts of the world ....

[I]t regards people's wars as a mortal danger....

As for revolutionary wars waged by the oppressed nations and peoples, so far
from opposing them, we invariably give them firm support and active aid. It has
15
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been so in the past, it remains so in the present and, when we grow in strength as
time goes on, we will give them still more support and aid in the future.' 5
The safe aspects claimed by Marshal Lin for wars of liberation would disappear, of
course, in the event of a serious military confrontation with the United States in
Vietnam. As General Maxwell Taylor has pointed out, such an invalidation of the
Chinese theory would serve to demonstrate the correctness of the Soviet emphasis on
peaceful coexistence and would convict the Chinese leadership of a most serious
blunder."6
It becomes necessary now to inquire into the legal status of the activities described,
with particular reference of course to liberation propaganda.

I
THE LEGAL STATUS OF LIBERATION PROPAGANDA

One of the basic principles underlying all other norms of traditional international
law is the equal claim to integrity of all sovereign states. If a given state, in time of
peace, disseminates, through its own organs or agents, propaganda within another
state, propaganda hostile to the government of that second state and indeed of a kind
designed to incite subjects of that state to rebellion, then the integrity of the target
state has been violated. Under such conditions, an international delinquency has
taken place and the activities of the interfering state must be regarded as being in
violation of international law: illegal intervention has been committed. 7
It is, of course, well known that no rule of international law "has ever ascribed
anything like a sacred character to the constitution of any country. No rule of law
...can

be held to deprive a people of its right to change its form of government,
whether by ballot or by bullet, nor does any existing rule maintain that such a change
must be the handiwork of a majority in any nation."'" The Charter of the United
Nations recognizes these facts when its terms favor the "self-determination of
peoples," for this may take the form, among others, of rebellion to overthrow an
unpopular government, to oust a colonial regime, or to unite separate political units.
If internal war comes to a country and is of a purely domestic nature and originthat is, if there exists a provable absence of foreign interference in the struggleand if the outcome of that conflict is at all in doubt, then the incumbent government
cannot ask for outside assistance to quell the rebellion. The logic behind this rule
is that, under the conditions outlined, the government cannot be regarded by outsiders
5
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as speaking for the state-in fact, neither faction can be assumed then to speak for
the state.' 9
If, on the other hand, internal war has been incited, fomented, aided, abetted,
supported, or encouraged from across the national frontier of the afflicted state, then
there appears to exist an undoubted right on the part of the government of the target
state to request assistance from others. However-and this represents a delicate
point of interpretation-it has been asserted that a state responding to such an
appeal for assistance must limit its aid, whatever its nature might be, to the territorial limits of the requesting target state.20
It should be kept in mind, moreover, that in the case of an internal war stimulated
or aided from the outside by means of subversive propaganda or by other means, the
propaganda in question is seldom, if ever, in modern times aimed at the promotion
of a mere unorganized rising against the incumbent government. What is normally
needed and wanted, in addition, is the recruitment of a "counter-elite" capable of controlling increasing proportions of the physical and organizational instruments of
power. Furthermore, competing elements, encountered all too frequently in actuality,
within this counter-elite must be coordinated so as to reduce frictions. And, last but
not least, the supporting power must find a way by which the counter-elite, upon its
successful seizure of control in the target state, can achieve not only legitimacy but
also permanency. In every case, that elite must somehow convert itself into a majority
or at the very least win the passive support and acceptance of the majority.2 '
Returning to the basic problem, namely, a rebellion supported from the outside, it
is generally accepted that, before assistance can be lawfully granted to the requesting government of the target state, determination must be made in some manner
as to the actual existence of outside intervention in the internal affairs of the requesting state. Obviously that determination cannot be left to the latter state. It must
either be undertaken by the state whose aid has been requested or by a supranational
agency, either universal or regional in scope. The determination thus arrived at would
settle whether the requesting government was legally able to speak for its state and
therefore able to request outside assistance. 22
A. Subversion in International Law
The diplomatic practice of large and small states over a period of more than X70
years has demonstrated conclusively that governmental subversive intervention in the
I'See
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internal affairs of another sovereign state was regarded as a violation of the norms of
customary international law.23 In addition, resolutions adopted by various international organs may be taken to represent a consensus of the community of nations as
to desired elements in rules of customary law, even though those rules might not yet
have crystallized from the status of usages to binding, obligatory custom. This is a
controversial area of legal thinking. The present writer cannot accept, to name one
instance, the views of Goodrich, who, while admitting that the passage of a resolution
in the General Assembly of the United Nations does not by itself create international
law, nevertheless maintains that such resolutions are evidence of customary international law. Particularly does the present writer reject the contention that when such
resolutions are sufficiently clear, universal, and sustained over a long period of time,
they might become "almost incontestable evidence" to establish a rule of customary
24
law.
Similar doubts are maintained by this writer about Whitton and Larson's characterization of such resolutions as "remarkably probative" of rules of customary
international law.2 Nevertheless, Spykman succumbed, perhaps, to a desire to overplay his argument when he wrote, years ago, that "resolutions, particularly Pan
American resolutions, are usually melodious in tone and indicative of a fine appreciation of literary style. Collected together, they make a charming exhibit and show
what artistic results can flow from co-operation between legal and poetic minds. '26
It is true that some writers in international law accept norms, principles, and rights,
all based on resolutions passed in international organizations. 7 Yet the vital element
of intent appears to be lacking in such resolutions, intent to create legally binding
obligations accepted as such by the very states voting for the resolutions. The correct
status of such instruments has been described admirably by the late Mrs. Eleanor
Roosevelt, then delegate from the United States, in connection with the oft-cited
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" of 1948:
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance that
we keep dearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not a treaty;
it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement
of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of human rights
and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by a
formal vote of its members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement for
all peoples of all nations. 28
"
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On the other hand, some publicists have gone so far afield from the traditional
interpretation of international legal norm formation that they have characterized
General Assembly resolutions as "a formal source, per se, of binding international
law principles."2' In essence, their approach has been that one should ask, in "experiential terms," whether an alleged principle was actually observed as such by both
main legal systems found in the world today, regardless of whether that principle
was created by the older formal sources of international law. Such an approach
ignores the fact that even though transgression of a rule might occur with such
frequency that the rule might be regarded as obsolescent, the existence of the rule
could not be doubted. 0 The solution, it is believed, would then be to revitalize the
rule if it were to be preserved and maintained. And this might well be done within
the framework of existing legal orders, not through mechanisms in part created by
and certainly guided by the political demands of possibly quite ephemeral international situations.
It is indeed difficult for a believer in the traditional structure of the law of nations
to agree with the "modern" point of view which holds that there has emerged "in fact
a new cold-war international law ... that corresponds, more or less accurately, to the
actual state of Soviet-Western legal relations-a new 'inter-bloc' international law
that, in some or many respects, may exist separately and distinct from (though not
necessarily in opposition to) 'classical' international law."31 No one can doubt that
the existing rules of international law are not immutable or that the law can and
is being adjusted to changing needs of the family of nations. But the claim for an
"inter-bloc" law basically represents a claim of legal status for political moves quite
distinct from, and in some instances in violation of, generally accepted rules of the
law of nations 2
A large volume of treaties, bilateral or regional in scope, deals with the subject of
subversive propaganda from the point of view of curbing or prohibiting altogether
the practices involved. While a number of such agreements date back to the era
of the French Revolution, and while others are found at various dates during the
nineteenth century, the bulk of the conventions in question have originated in the
twentieth century.
Russia in particular became a signatory to agreements banning official hostile
propaganda, beginning with the abortive treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918P On
a regional level, a number of inter-American instruments include prohibitions on
intervention which, if interpreted properly, would appear to include prohibitions on
governmental propaganda activities. The often cited "Draft Code of Offences Against
29 See McWhinney, Changing International Law Method and Objectives in the Era of the SovietWestern D~tente, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 n.48 (1965).
80See Whitton, supra note 8, at 120-21 on this point.
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the Peace and Security of Mankind," as compiled by the International Law Commission, contained prohibitions on subversive intervention and on the incitement
to civil strife in another state, both in the original version of 1951 and in the latest
Even though nothing more has been done about converting
revised version of 1954'

that draft code into a binding treaty, it may be taken to represent the nearest thing
yet achieved to the sort of general consensus on subversive intervention which all

writers and much state practice assert to exist in customary international law. (Other
treaties dealing with subversive propaganda will be discussed below.)

Without entering into the theoretical controversy centering on the position and
importance of "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as a proper
source of the rules of international law, 5 it can be maintained reasonably that the

domestic law counterpart of the illegality of subversive propaganda can be found
in the very generally encountered regulations dealing with the use of words to cause

or to incite harm or injury. Since a commonly desired result of subversive propaganda, in particular of liberation propaganda, is violence against persons, the commonly found domestic laws prohibiting the use of words to cause murder, physical
harm, and similar results can be applied to international subversive propaganda
in this connectionO 6

Judicial decisions, as subsidiary evidences of norms of the law, deal but sparingly
with the subject of subversive intervention. One has to rely primarily on the
Nuremberg judgments in this connection, and while not all aspects of those judgments are above justified criticism,3 7 it can be maintained that they treated subversive
propaganda as illegal, both as a warmongering device and in the aspect of subversive
"fifth-column" activities specifically mentioned in the indictment at the trials in question.

While the writings of publicists cannot be regarded as sources of rules of international law (at least not in modern times), to the undoubted chagrin of some members
of the group, these scholarly works may be used as subsidiary evidence of the existence
of such rules. The overwhelming bulk of all writers in international law, past and
present, concur in a rare demonstration of agreement that it is illegal for a state to
undertake any act of subversive intervention 3 And to the extent that the frequently
a"Text of the revised draft, with commentary, reprinted in 49 Am. J. INT'L L. Sum''. 19-23 (955);
see also VON GLHns, op. cit. supra note x8, at 714-16, particularly on the negative views adopted by the
United States on this matter.
3' See, e.g., Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International Law,
57 Amr. J. INT's. L. 279 (1963); Oppenheim, The Natural Law Thesis: Affirmation or Denial?, 51 Am.
POL. Set. REV. 41 (1957); Jaffa, Comment on Oppenheim: In Defense of "The Natural Law Thesis," id.
at 54; Oppenheim, Non-Cognitivist Rebuttal, id. at 65.
30 W-erroN & LARSON 103; see id. at 71-75 for examples.
- Consult voe GLAHN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 707-08 nn. 22-25, and the literature there cited,
for examples of the subsequent criticisms of the trials.
11 See instructive listing in WHTroN & LAtsoN 96; see also MARTIN, Op. cit. supra note 27, at 57,
215 n.3; 2 L. OPP'NHEI s, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 162a ( 7 th ed. Lauterpacht, 1952); ELLERY
C. STOWE.LL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 378 (i92i); ANN V. THOMAS & A. J. THoMAs, JR.,
NoN-IerTaRVNTIoN: THE LAW AND ITS INPORT IN THE AmEascAs 276 (1956); Friedmann, supra note 14,
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encountered overlapping between subversive and warmongering propaganda occurs,
other authorities can be cited in support of the illegal character of the practice8O
This well-nigh universal unanimity among writers has been opposed, as might
be expected, by a few dissenters and doubters. To no one's surprise, Communist
sources, while nominally opposed to all forms of subversive intervention, somehow
find a loophole excusing Socialist intervention. Thus, in addition to the views already
reported above, one Soviet source ingeniously suggested as early as 1952 that "the

principle of non-intervention is not a definite and forever-established principle; it
might have a progressive or a reactionary meaning. 40 The "progressive meaning"
obviously would apply if the doctrine of nonintervention were to be applied against
practices followed by a non-Socialist state.
Among other doubters, Rosenau observed pessimistically, in the presumed interest
of realism, that
Internal wars are ...

too explosive for policy-makers to be guided by legal rather

than political considerations in their reactions to them. Law takes precedence
when vital national interests are not challenged or when it coincides with such
interests ....

In such situations [internal wars, civil wars], consequently, the law

loses force and the distinction between intervention and nonintervention tends to
be obliterated.4 1
And Loewenstein came to the conclusion that nonintervention represented a principle
of international law which was honored more by breach than by observance. He
suggested that the American Society of International Law establish "a study group
'
to reconsider the continued validity and value of such a rule."'42
B. Intervention by International Organizations
A few comments on the subject of intervention on the part of international organizations appear to be indicated at this point. It is suggested that such a concept should
not be concerned with United Nations peacekeeping forces or with similar direct interventionary practices-these are too remote from the subject under consideration. But
is it possible or reasonable to envision "subversive intervention," say through
General Assembly debates or resolutions, by which an international agency, intentionally or otherwise, might actually promote or stimulate internal strife, or even
a "war of liberation," in a given state? Certainly there is available copious docuat 69; Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 22 AM. J. INT'L L.
105 (1928); Preuss, InternationalResponsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign States, 28 Am.
J. INT'L L. 649 (1934); Schwarzkopf, supra note i, at 197; Van Dyke, The Responsibility of States
for InternationalPropaganda,34 AM. J. INT'L L. 58 (940).
" Consult WVITTON & LAsoN 75-76, and particularly Wright, The Crime of "War-Mongering," 42
AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1948).
"'Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo 8o-82 (Jan. 1952), quoted in Kuski, Present Trends in Soviet International Law, 1953 PROcEEDiNrs 59, 63.
" Rosenau, Internal War as an InternationalEvent, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 45, 54
(Rosenau ed. 1964).
" Karl Loewenstein, discussion, in 1961 PROCEEDINGS 40.
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mentation for the charge that both the Soviet Union and Communist China have
made frequent use, in the furtherance of subversion in other states, of what
transpired in the General Assembly or of what was approved textually in resolutions.
In such instances, the international organization itself was innocent of subversion
and only the "users" of the "product" could be charged with subversive intervention.
Yet could not the organization itself, even through the mere reporting of its debates, be guilty somehow of subversive acts?" Wright, in analyzing this problem, arrived at several conclusions. He believed that, in the case of a resolution,
determination of its interventionary nature required a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and concurrence of the great powers in the Security Council.44 On
the other hand, placement of a matter on the agenda of the Assembly and discussion
of that matter did not constitute intervention, in the view of the General Assembly
itself.4 Wright, furthermore, was obviously correct when he stated that the truth
of a charge of intervention in domestic matters, under article 2, paragraph 7, of the
Charter could not be determined until discussion had actually taken place and an
analysis of a proposed resolution had been accomplished thereby.4
It appears reasonable to assume, on the other hand, that a resolution criticizing
the conduct of a particular state, calling upon it to change its policy, or calling
upon other states to act against it, although not 'intervention by the United Nations'

as that term would be understood in international law, may be forbidden by Article 2,
paragraph 7, in case the state against which the resolution is directed has not

violated an international obligation and consequently is acting within its domestic
jurisdiction. 47

The present writer believes that since article io of the Charter establishes the right
of the General Assembly to discuss any question or matter within the scope of the
Charter, it would be possible to envision situations in which mere discussion, accompanied by opposing arguments, of a given matter might actually (upon being reported to the population of a given state) represent subversive propaganda, even
though such had not been the intention of the General Assembly.
It is thus possible to speak of intervention by international organizations and to
regard, from the point of view of legitimate governments, such intervention as subversive and hence to be met by countermeasures by the affected government, just as
if the subversive intervention had been caused by a specific foreign state, its agencies,
or its agents!

8

' See in particular Scorr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 140-55, as well as Wright, The Legality of Intervention Under the United Nations Charter, 1957 PPOCEEDINGS 79.
"Consult the pioneer investigation by Wright, is Dixcusion Intervention?, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 102,
io6 (1956).
"I1d. at xo6-07.
' Id.at Io8.
"'Id.at xo6-07.
"' See also Scor, op. cit. supra note 3, at 153, on this point, as well as Karabus, United Nations Actlvities in the Congo, i96i PaocEEDNmrs 30.
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II
EXISTING CONTROLS OVER LIBERATION PROPAGANDA

Almost four decades ago, Hersch Lauterpacht, in one of the earliest studies of
subversive propaganda and its relationships to the law of nations, penned this thoughtful and prophetic paragraph:
But the menaced state is to a considerable degree powerless against revolutionary
propaganda generated abroad, possibly spread from the air by means of publications or broadcast by wireless, inciting its population to armed revolt and its troops
to rebellion; against revolutionary organizations formed abroad with the view to
assisting an actual or impending revolt in their mother country; against moneys
being subscribed or lent, or other assistance given, for such purposes. What protection, if any, from such acts falling short of hostile expeditions does international
law afford, and what duties, if any, does it impose upon the state from whose

territory such acts originate?49

An answer to the question posed by the eminent Briton is not easily supplied, for thus
far no real controls over international propaganda disseminated by governments have
been included in the body of generally accepted rules of international law. While
there are numerous rules, 50 they lack general acceptance and in all too many instances
lack application among the few parties to relevant treaties. Above all, there is no
universal convention regulating subversive propaganda.
A. General Treaty Law on Subversive Propaganda
The League of Nations did not produce a general treaty controlling international
propaganda. Its Assembly studied the subject in connection with the preparation of
the Preliminary Draft of the "General Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War," in May i93i. But while the Assembly was moved to declare that under
certain conditions "aggressive propaganda against a foreign Power may in certain
circumstances, constitute a veritable threat to the world,"51 this referred obviously to
warmongering propaganda rather than to subversion. Similarly, the Legal Committee of the ill-starred League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation
'2
of Armaments, in 1933, recommended only the prohibition of "war propaganda.
The United Nations Charter does not fully qualify as a general treaty controlling

subversive propaganda. The relevant portions of this instrument (article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, and articles 39 and 51) by their wording as well as by their context
appear to make it quite clear that "force" means "armed force" and that other
unfriendly or even hostile acts, such as diplomatic pressure, economic warfare, propa,"Lauterpacht, supra note 38, at 107.
" Consult the extensive bibliography on the subject in WHITTON & LAtsoN 55-57 nn.a-2.
"League of Nations, VII Political (1931) (A.1 4 .93I.VII) (Pub. Sales No. x931.VII.8. 4 3 ); see id. at
32.

3.League of Nations, IX Disarmament (1935)

19 3 5.IX.4).

1-4, at 702 (Conf. D./C.G.r42)

(Pub. Sales No.
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ganda, and subversion, are not covered by the Charter as far as its literal meaning
53
is concerned.
On the other hand, a number of attempts have been made to include subversive
intervention under a category labelled "indirect aggression," the argument then proceeding to a justification of state or United Nations action to put an end to such
aggression. Thus President Eisenhower stated in a radio address on July 15, 1958, in
connection with the United States intervention in the Lebanon, that the United
States did possess a right of intervention in accordance with article 51 of the Charter
in a case of "indirect aggression." After referring to related resolutions adopted by
the General Assembly in 1949 and 195o (discussed below), he defined the indirect
aggression at hand as attempts "'under the cover of a fomented civil strife' to 'put
into domestic control those whose real loyalty is to the aggressor."' 54 The late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in a speech on March 8, 1955, and the late President Herbert Hoover, testifying at Charter Revision Hearings on April 21, 1955, 5'
before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, maintained that
"act of aggression" should cover "indirect aggression" through fifth columns, foreignorganized conspiracies, infiltration, and ideological propaganda." But, in the meaning of traditional general international law, "aggression" has always been utilized
with reference only to the use of, or the threat to use, armed force.
The General Assembly had declared in its Resolution 380 (V) of November 17,
o, that "fomenting civil strife
i95
in the interest of a foreign Power" constituted
aggression. It should be noted, however, that this was done through a resolutionand hence lacked legally binding force and could not be viewed as an intent to amend
the clearly contrary meaning of the words of the Charter-and that the General
Assembly (and also the International Law Commission) has never been able to agree
on a generally acceptable definition of aggression. It must be assumed that the
Charter does not apply to internal wars, no matter how generated, unless such a war
exceeds its domestic characteristics by constituting a threat to the peace.
Two draft general treaties have to be mentioned in connection with the search
for general treaty law applicable to liberation (subversive) propaganda. Even though
neither instrument has been adopted since its formulation, guidelines for possible
future general treaty law may be found therein. The "Draft Declaration on Rights
and Duties of States," developed by the United Nations International Law Com" To this extent Wright is absolutely correct in The Legality of Intervention Under the United
Nations Charter, 1957 PROCEEDINGS 79, and also in Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, at
529

(1960).

"' Quoted in Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 Am. j. INrL L. 112, 113 (I959);
see also McClintock, The American Landing in Lebanon, 88 U.S. NAv. INST. PROC., 65 (Oct. 1962);
O'Brien, InternationalLaw, Morality, and America Interventions, 2oi CATHOLIC WoRLD 388 (1965).
ru 32 DEP'T STATE BULL, 460 (1955).
"Hearings on Review of the United Nations Charter Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1741, 1743 (9.55).
"Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 514, 526 (1956).
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mission in 1948 as the model of an eventual convention, " prohibited in article 3
intervention in the internal or external affairs of another state. Kelsen, viewing
intervention as dictatorial in nature (i.e., the threat or use of force) regarded the prohibition as redundant, since force was declared to be illegal in article 9 of the draft
declaration.5 9 If, on the other hand, "intervention" were to be regarded as covering
additional other methods of interference, then article 3 would, of course, make sense.
But if it were to be incorporated in a future convention, the meaning of "intervention"
would have to be defined explicitly. Article 4 of the draft declaration (revised)
asserted that "every State has the duty to refrain from fomenting civil strife in the
territory of another State, and to prevent the organization within its territory of
activities calculated to foment such civil strife.""0 These provisions are self-explanatory, although a closer definition of state responsibility, relating to state-controlled
agencies or political groupings, might have been added.
The second instrument was the "Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Security of Mankind," developed by the International Law Commission in 195i and
revised slightly in 1954.1 Article 2(5) spelled out the prohibition on subversive intervention as an offense against the peace and security of mankind, namely "the undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of activities calculated to
foment civil strife in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State
of organized activities calculated to foment civil strife in another State." 2 This provision provided a somewhat more satisfactory definition of the prohibited act than
did the corresponding section of the 1949 draft declaration.
One particular effort to achieve a general treaty for the control of propaganda
should be mentioned briefly at this point. In September 1936, work on the "Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace" was completed
under the auspices of the League of Nations. A total of twenty-two states eventually
became parties to the agreement, thirteen by ratification and nine by subsequent
accession. The instrument, which came into effect on April 2, 1938, constrained the
parties (article z) to ensure that "their transmissions do not constitute an incitement
to war, or to acts likely to lead to war." The current status of this 1936 instrument
is in doubt. At the time of its conclusion, the future members of the Axis in the
Second World War did not sign the treaty. The United States refused to become
a party, on the grounds that the American government could not exercise the neces" Text reprinted in 44 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 15-18 (1950); see also Kelsen, The Draft Declaration
on Rights and Duties of States-CriticalRemarks, 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 259 (X950), and voN GLmN¢, op.
cit. supra note x8, at I25. See also McWhinney, The "New" Countries and the "New" InternationalLaw:
The United Nations' Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States [Mexico,
1964], 6o AM. J. INT'L L. I, 21-25 (1966).

11 Kelsen, supra note 58, at 268.
Go44 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. at 36 (195o).
"1Text, with elaborate commentary, of x95i version reprinted in 45 Am. J. INT'L L. Sup'. 103-39
(1951).
"Id. at 128.
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sary controls over its broadcasting stations-and also that few transmissions to other
countries were being made.
B. Regional Treaty Law on Subversive Propaganda
In contrast to the absence of general international treaty law governing subversive and/or liberation propaganda, a considerable number of regional (particularly
Western Hemisphere) instruments prohibit intervention in terms broad enough to
include the propaganda activities under consideration. It is interesting to note how
the concept of intervention, in various guises, came to be reflected in these agreements.
One of the earliest instruments, the 1928 Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States in the Event of Civil Strife (ratified by the United States in 1931), dealt exclusively with military assistance (through personnel and supplies) to rebel groups.3
The Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Treaty on Non-Aggression and Conciliation of
1933, ratified by the United States, prohibited "intervention either diplomatic or
armed" (subject to obligations assumed through other regional agreements).I The
1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (ratified by the United
States but with a reservation) provided that "no state has the right to intervene in
the internal or external affairs of another." 5 (Note the intrusion of this unrealistic
phrasing at this point in the historical development.)
In 1936, the Buenos Aires Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention held
to be "inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and
for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the parties,""6
while the 1936 Buenos Aires Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties between the American States, ratified by the United
States, served to reaffirm prior agreements on the subject of nonintervention." At
the same time, the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation (Buenos Aires), ratified by the United States, asserted that "intervention by one
state in the internal or external affairs of another state is condemned." And the same
condemnation appeared again, two years later, in the 1938 "Declaration of Lima."
The Montevideo and Buenos Aires instruments were then reaffirmed in the Act
of Chapultepec in 1945, signed by the United States. The 1947 Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Rio de Janeiro, had been drafted in a form which
related it directly and by intent to articles 52-54 of the United Nations Charter. In
article 3 of the Rio instrument, provisions had been made for regional collective
action in the case of armed attack on any one of the parties, while article 6 called
22 Am. J. INT'L L. Supr.
8&28 Am. J. INT'L L. SuPP.

159-6o (art. z) (1928).
79-80 (art. 3) (1934).

do Id. at 75, 76 (art. 8).
o31 Am. J. INT'L L. SUMw.57 (art. I) (1937).
17 Id. at 59 (art. i).
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for collective action in the case of any aggression, other than an armed attack, affecting the territory or sovereignty of any American state0 8
In 1948, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), signed at
Bogota and ratified by the United States, provided in article 15 that
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements.0 9
This exemplary prohibition was wisely qualified, however, in article 19 of the treaty,
which exempted from its application "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace
and security in accordance with existing treaties."
It would appear reasonable to conclude that at least under the terms of the Rio
Treaty and of the OAS Charter, subversive propaganda aimed at the territorial integrity or at the sovereignty of any of the American states would have to be classified
as forbidden, and hence would give rise to a legitimate right to ask for assistance, on
the part of the target state, once the foreign origin of the propaganda had been
established by those to whom the appeal for help had been addressed.
The Tenth Inter-American Conference, held in 1954 at Caracas, adopted a
"Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of American
States Against the Intervention of International Communism."'" This interesting
document, initiated by the United States and supported, ironically enough, by Cuba,
was adopted by a vote of 17 to i, with Argentina and Mexico abstaining; the lone
dissenting vote was cast by Guatemala. The Declaration condemned the activities
of the international Communist movement as intervention in American affairs,
affirmed thedetermination of the American states to take measures for the protection
of their political independence against such intervention, and asserted:
That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American state
by the international communist movement . .. would constitute a threat to the
sovereignty and political independence of the American states, endangering the
peace of America, and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the
adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties. 71
It should be remembered, in connection with the Caracas Declaration, that while such
instruments do not require ratification by the signatories, and therefore do not correspond to treaties in the orthodox meaning of the term, Latin American states have
J. INT'L L. Surp. 53-58 (i949); see also Scorr, op. cit.
and Whitton, Efforts to Curb Dangerous Propaganda, 41 Am. J. INTL L. 899

08 Text of Rio Treaty reprinted in 43 Am.

supra note 3, at

1o,

(1947).
' 46 Am. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 43, 46 (1952).
7
°Text in 48 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 123 (r954); consult also Fenwick, Intervention-at the Caracas
Conference, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 451 (1954), and especially Fenwick, Proposed Control Over the Radio as

an Inter-American Duty in Cases of Civil Strife, id. at 289.
71 48 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 124 (1954).
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traditionally regarded their inter-American declarations as creative of binding legal
obligations.B It is, therefore, permissible to view Latin American declarations as a
source of regional international law.
In 1959, the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in the
Declaration of Santiago, Chile, reaffirmed earlier American resolutions aimed at
international ideologies and again declared the existence of antidemocratic regimes
Similar views were voiced at
to constitute a danger to the Western Hemisphere.'
Rica.'74
Costa
Jose,
at
San
Ministers
the i96o Meeting of Foreign
In pursuit of the policies laid down first at the Caracas meeting, the Organ of
Consultation of the OAS, meeting at Punta del Este in January 1962, approved a
resolution calling on the American states to "strengthen their capacity to counteract
threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security result75
ing from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers."
This document, coupled with the earlier agreements, supplied the basis for LatinAmerican support of the United States in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.
The discussion of regional inter-American instruments dealing with subversion
intervention cannot be concluded without mentioning the well-known Resolution
passed in the United States House of Representatives on September 20, 1965, by a vote
of 312 to 53.76 This resolution, while it expressed only "the sense of the House" and
thus lacked any force in law, nevertheless caused a vigorous and critical reaction
among the Latin American states. After reciting the threats and dangers arising in
the Western Hemisphere out of "subversive forces known as international Communism," and asserting that such threats would endanger the peace and safety
of the United States, the resolution concluded with the following statement:
i. Any such subversive domination or threat of it violates the principles of the
Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions
heretofore adopted by the American Republics; and
2. In any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual
or collective self-defense, which could go so far as to resort to armed force, and in
accordance with the declarations and principles above stated, take steps to forestall
or combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form,
by the subversive forces known as international Communism and its agencies in
the Western Hemisphere. 77
The protests against the resolution centered on its unilateral aspects, on the fact that
the normally temporary character of any counter-intervention acts had not been
72

See Crane, supra note 9, at

21;

see also Travis, Collective Intervention by the Organization of

American States, 1957 PROCEEDINGS 100.
73 55

Am. J. INT'L L. 537 (I96i).
4 N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 9g6o,
p. i, col. 8.

7
7

1VoN GLAIHN, op. cit. supra note s8, at 513.
See Fenwick, The Issues at Punta del Este: Nonintervention v. Collective Security, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 469 (1962).
7' N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1965, p. 3, Cols. 3, 4.
7
U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 4, 1965, p. 14.
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stressed, and on the origin of the resolution in the legislative rather than in the executive branch of the United States government.
C. Particular (Bilateral) Treaty Controls of Subversive Propaganda
A rather large number of bilateral treaties concluded mostly during the past
fifty or so years have included provisions for the limitation of international propaganda. A detailed examination of these instruments must be considered to be
beyond the scope of this investigation, nor can the instruments in question be con78
sidered as creating new rules of international law
D. "Resolutions" on Subversive Propaganda
Reference has been made earlier to resolutions adopted by international organiza-

tions. Best known among them are (i) the famous United Nations General Assembly Resolution of November 3, 1947 [Resolution Ixio(II)], adopted unanimously,
which condemned "all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which
is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression";"9 (2) the General Assembly Resolution on the
Essentials of Peace [Resolution 29 o(IV)], adopted on December I, 1949, by a vote of
53 to 5, with one abstention, which called on all nations "to refrain from any threats
or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity
of any state, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any
State";"0 and (3)the Assembly Resolution on "Peace Through Deeds," adopted by
a vote of 50 to 5 on November 17, I95O,1 in which the General Assembly condemned intervention and denounced open aggression as well as the fomenting of civil
war as "the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world."
It should be noted that in these instances the General Assembly studiously avoided
use of the terms "outlaw" or "prohibit," as far as the practices in question were concerned. Basically the consensus achieved in each case represented a moral preachment, not a legally binding obligation for the membership of the United Nations.
Similarly, the 1948 United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information and of the
Press, in its Resolution II, which was adopted by majority vote, condemned all propaganda designed or likely to provoke any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression, as well as all distortions or falsifications of news through either
82
private or government channels
71 An extensive listing of treaties may be found in MArTIN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 89-96.
"'U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Ric. 2d Sess., Resolutions 14 (A/Si9) (947); I947-48 U.N. YEARBmooK 93
(U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1949.1.13); see id. at 91-93; see also Wright, The Crime of "War-Mongering/' 42
AM. J. INT'L L. x28 (1948).
'0 U.N GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 4 th Sess., Resolutions 13 (A/1251) (1949); 1948-49 U.N. YEARBooK 344
(U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1950.1.1).
"1 N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1950, P. I, cOl. 5'U.N. Doc. No. E/Conf.6/C.u/x9; see Wilson, International Law and Proposed Freedom of Information, 39 Am. J. Ir'L L. 79o (I945), for the background.
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More recently, the General Assembly, by a vote of lO9 to o (with one abstentionthe United Kingdom), adopted on December 21, 1965, a resolution condemning all
forms of intervention in other states, including subversion and terrorism. The document went on to state that no country was to "organize, assist, foment, finance, incite
or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state."83
Later in the resolution was to be found a reaffirmation of the right of any state to
choose its political, economic, social, and cultural systems without outside interference.
On the same day, the General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 104 to o (with one
abstention-Mexico-later changed to an affirmative vote), a convention to be submitted to the members for ratification, on the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. No clue was supplied
as to how the provisions of such an instrument would be reconciled with the nonintervention resolution, with its asserted national freedom of choice relative to internal
systems, or how the treaty related to the Charter provisions concerning nonintervention in domestic affairs.8 4 It is presumed that dissenting states would not ratify
the treaty, but essentially a conflict of General Assembly policies appears to have been
recorded.
While resolutions adopted in international organizations are denied here the status
of treaties, it must be admitted that the resolutions on intervention adopted on
occasion by the General Assembly have served at times as determinants for subsequent United Nations actions, as Sohn has pointed out with references to actual instances8 5 Similarly, resolutions have played an important role in the operations of
the OAS with respect to various forms of subversive intervention. Thus Resolution
XXXII adopted at the founding conference of the OAS at Bogota in 1948 asserted
that, "by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, the political
activities of international communism or of any other totalitarian doctrine is [sic]
incompatible with the concept of American freedom, which rests upon two undeniable postulates: the dignity of man as an individual, and the sovereignty of the
nation as a State."8 8 To a similar effect are the resolutions mentioned earlier in connection with the 1954 Caracas and the 1962 Punta del Este meetings of the OAS!'
E. Municipal Law and Subversive Propaganda
While it is correct to state that many countries have enacted domestic legislation
prohibiting or limiting propaganda aimed at other states and their officials and
8

Res. 213I(XX), U.N. Doc. No. A/Res/2131/Rev. i (1966); text in 6o Am. J.

INT'L

L. 662, 663

(x966).
"*Annexed to Res. 2=ot(XX), U.N. Doc. No. A/Res/2io6(XX) (1966); text in 6o Am. J. IDrWL L.
65o-6x (x966). See also the critical editorial by Lawrence, The U.N.'s Gobbledygool, U.S. News &
World Report, Jan. 3, 1966, p. 82.
8 Sohn, The RMle of the United Nations in Civil Wars, 1963 PROCEEDINGS 208, 212-13.
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PROCEEDINGS 91, 95.

"' Texts reprinted in 56 Am. J. Irr'L L. 6ox (1962).
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agents, this bulky mass of regulatory measures does not really apply to the subject
here under consideration. In the first place, municipal laws on the dissemination of
such propaganda basically apply only to private agencies and to individuals disseminating propaganda from the national territory of the legislating state. This is not
always true, to be sure, for the Russian "Peace Defense Act" of March 2, i95i,88 and
the Czechoslovak "Act on the Protection of Peace," of December 20, 1950,89 are

-

worded in such a way as to apply to anyone guilty of the offenses listed therein,
regardless of where he might be located. The normal limitation on the territorial
sovereignty of the legislating state is, of course, legally correct: the authority of the
latter does not ordinarily extend beyond its own frontiers (vessels being a well-known
exemption). On the other hand, the target state of subversive propaganda might
claim a right of prosecution for acts committed beyond its own territory under the
doctrine laid down long ago by the Institute of International Law, that "every state
has the right to punish acts committed outside its territory, even by foreigners, when
the act constitutes ... an attempt against its security. '" This assumes, naturally, an
ability to "lay hands" on the offending parties, who, in the scope of our inquiry,
would be government officials!
In the second place, and more important, one basic fact nullifies for practical purposes the value of all municipal law regulating subversive propaganda, namely
that the propaganda discussed here is officially sponsored, governmentally disseminated propaganda. It must be assumed that the authorities in any state engaged in
subversive propaganda activities will place themselves above the laws promulgated
by themselves, either without explanation to anyone or under the plea of urgent
national interest.
F. Governmental Responsibility for Subversive Propaganda
The presence or absence of municipal law intended to regulate propaganda dissemination is quite unimportant from the point of view of this inquiry for still
another reason, one that relates directly to broadcasting (and now to telecasting,
too)." Normally a radio or television station must be licensed by an agency of the
national government in whose territory operations are undertaken-and, within broad
limits, this also applies in most instances to government-owned installations beyond
the level, say, of intraservice communications in the armed forces. The licenses in
question presumably relate to the "public service" performed by the communications
88
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Text in 46 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 34 (1952)-

Id. at 34-35.
0 ANNUAIRE DE L'INsTITuT DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL 281 (1879-I880); see also 29 Ams. J. INTL L.
Su's. II, at 543 (1935), and art. 3 of the Draft Convention: "A State has jurisdiction with respect to any
crime committed in whole or in part within its territory. This jurisdiction extends to . . . (b)
Any attempts outside its territory to commit a crime in whole or in part within its territory." Id. at 480.
911 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 19, §§ I92-19 3 F, supplies an excellent summary of controls to the end
of the Second World War; consult also the suggestive essay by Neuner, Broadcastsfrom Foreign CountriesConflict of Laws Problems, 33 Gao. L.J. 401-17 (1945).
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medium involved, and as a result a public interest of some magnitude is created.
Hence the state granting the operating permission, retaining normally a right of
control or supervision, can be held responsible internationally for the abuse of the
public service function through the dissemination of subversive propaganda 2
Since the Communist states have, on the surface at least, accepted as legal norms
the existing prohibitory rules on intervention, they could be held responsible for
interventionary propaganda emanating from their territories. 3 Since, however, international law is demonstrably weak with respect to sanctions in this sphere, it now
becomes necessary to deal with the problem of improving enforcement of the rules
governing subversive intervention.
III
POSSIBLE LEGAL CONTROLS OF LiBERATION (SuBvERSIVE) PROPAGANDA

It is quite evident that the practices of states have not conformed to the traditional
rules governing intervention. Not only has subversive intervention, including the
variety termed liberation propaganda, flourished, but counter-intervention, including
the use of propaganda, has become a part of modern international relations. This
situation, blamed by some on the increasing interdependence as well as on the penetrability of hitherto (at least in theory) impenetrable state sovereignty,9 4 has led to
an attitude of relative despair on the part of publicists and statesmen in many parts
of the world.
It is, of course, true that, in the words of Corbett, "law cannot be built upon a heedless sacrifice of reality," 95 and that "legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced
are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp." 6 Since existing
norms on nonintervention appear inadequate and have been violated on a recurring
basis in recent decades, it has been suggested by some writers that perhaps the traditional general rules should be repudiated in favor of a substitute group of new "horizontal norms," that is, norms based on patterns of behavior accepted by national
97
actors as obligatory.
Three points are advanced in answer to such suggestions. In the first place, in
the pithy words of Whitton and Larson, "a rule of law should not lightly be con-

"' Friedmann, Some Impacts of Social Organization on International Law, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 475
(1956); see also HERBERT NV. BviCGs, THE LAw OF NATIONS 325-26 (2d ed. 1952), on the relation of
national airspace to governmental responsibility for propaganda.
" See the compilation of relevant statements in Triska & Slusser, Treaties and Other Sources of Order
in InternationalRelations: The Soviet View, 5z Ae. J. INT'L L. 699, 719 n.64 (1958).
"' RscaA
A. Fr.s, LAw, MORALITY, AND VAR IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 12 (1963), and Scorr,
op. cit. supra note 3, at zoi.
"5Percy E. Corbett in his Translator'sPreface to CHmiuAs DR VIsscHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW at viii (1957).
9

"Mr.

Justice Holmes in The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922); see also Falk, Revolutionary

Nations and the Quality of International Legal Order, in Tm REvOLTrrION it WORLD PoLrrcs 310, 321
(Kaplan ed. 1962), for a similar view.
'7 Thus particularly Falk, Janus Tormented: The InternationalLaw of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL
AspcTs OF CIVIL SvuFE 85, 237-38 (Rosenau ed. 1964).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

sidered destroyed even by a considerable amount of battering in practice." ' In the
instance of subversive intervention, every major and most minor states have consistendy affirmed the illegality of the practice and have expressed an obligation to
accept the principle of law which forbids the practice, even sometimes while engaged
in the act forbidden and while seeking occasionally rather specious excuses for the
violation.
Second, as long as the norms in question are acknowledged to exist, a more fruitful search than replacement by horizontal norms essentially inspired by political
considerations (in this specific case, at least) would be to look for methods of implementation and of expansion of the norms in existence.
In the third place, the particular form of intervention under consideration-that
is, subversive or liberation propaganda, which strikes by definition at the very
foundations of the nation-state, the loyalty of its citizens-requires controls if the
existing structure of the family of nations (and with it its typical legal order) is to
continue without further serious erosion. The survival of the concept of the sovereign
state would seem to depend in large measure on the ability of all the states to create
effective, implementable rules governing subversion and then to proceed to the enforcement of those rules.
The remaining portions of this inquiry are therefore devoted to the presentation
and examination of recommendations for the legal and practical control of subversive intervention. It should be kept in mind, however, that any developments
taking place in international law for the protection of uncommitted or other states
against Communist subversion will also have to serve to protect Communist states
against subversive intervention undertaken by other states against them. No effective
legal order can tolerate the existence of a double standard in law, even though some
recent and current Communist pronouncements appear to favor the introduction and
preservation of such a standard.
A. Control Suggestions of Dubious Efficacy
A relatively small number of suggestions for the control of subversive intervention,
proposed over a number of years, merits brief examination in order to bare the weaknesses of the concepts outlined.
Not too many years ago, a sanction termed effective and practical was proposed
on a foundation of proportionality. 9 Since propaganda operated in the sphere
of communications, it was suggested that sanctions should be applied against the
disseminating state by denying it (through the General Assembly in order to circumvent a Security Council veto) the right to speak on the floor of the Assembly. In
case such wrist-slapping should prove to be ineffective, it was proposed further that
"all United Nations publications could place an embargo on the utterances of the
e WIUTTON & LARSON III.
o'See id. at 224-26.
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violator." Lastly, if all else failed, it was suggested that, under some form of undisclosed interpretation of the International Telecommunications Convention, the
I.T.U. could be brought to initiate action whereby the offending country would be
deprived of its right to the use of assigned radio frequencies.
The present writer fails to see how the placement of an offending country into a
kind of United Nations "Coventry" would deter that state from pursuing its interventionary activities as long as it deemed the latter to represent an important aspect
of its vital national interests. As far as the deprivation of frequency use would be
concerned, it would appear that the offending country could proceed happily and
without hurt to broadcast, as before, on the frequencies theretofore utilized.
Somewhat earlier, a whole array of assorted remedies for the control and termination of subversive intervention was prepared by one eminent publicist.0 0 None of the
proposals, however, approached a realistic solution of the problem at hand. For instance, "a reduction of international tensions" to moderate fears of aggression could
be viewed only as a pious hope as long as no practicable steps leading to such a
reduction were supplied. "Resolutions by the United Nations criticizing states that
violate their international obligations concerning aggression and subversive intervention" promised little beyond verbal condemnation of, and adverse publicity for,
the offenders, as did the concept of proposed resolutions calling upon states to observe
the principles of the Charter. The "setting of an example by states professing liberal
principles by eliminating racial discrimination and preparing colonies for selfgovernment" appeared to ignore the basic power reasons underlying the propaganda efforts utilizing appeals against racialism and colonialism, while the "extension of cultural exchanges and trade across the Iron Curtain and co-operation
among the states at each side in economic development," laudable though the intent
was, bore little, if any, relation to subversive propaganda aims and practices.
B. Political Remedies
Diplomacy per se does not appear to offer remedies for subversive propaganda
campaigns. At the same time, however, protests against such alien efforts registered
through diplomatic channels and with United Nations and regional organs appear to
possess some merit. If such protests are made regularly and are supported with
proper documentation (transcripts of broadcasts, copies of subversive literature, and
so on), the matter of subversion is placed on record pending eventual lodgment
of claims for reparation. °0 While protests normally would not lead to an abatement
of the subversive propaganda, the filing of documented protests would give rise
to publicity for the acts done by the propagandists (in effect, a sort of counterpropaganda would come into being), would call attention in other countries to the
100
Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 Am'.J. INT'L L. 521, 533-34 (i96o).
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subversion attempted, and might thus assist in enlisting popular and even governmental support abroad for the target state.
The admitted weakness of this argument rests in the great difficulty ordinarily
encountered in establishing a provable connection between the subversive propaganda and subsequent injury or damage suffered by the target state. Such a connection would represent, however, a necessary requirement for the establishment of
subsequent claims. Yet, as Friedmann pointed out,1 0 2 the measure of causation of

an unsuccessful rebellion attributable to alien subversive propaganda is highly questionable even in the most favorable situation, while a successful rising would eliminate all inquiry into the matter.
It is conceivable that the target state might employ diplomatic restrictions or
sanctions against the offending state if diplomatic or consular missions of the latter
served among the agencies engaged in the dissemination of the subversive and liberation propaganda. Modern history abounds with justified as well as with numerous
unjustified expulsions of foreign accredited agents charged with the spreading of
subversion. 0 3
The diplomatic sphere, in a rather broad sense, was also involved in some of
the recommendations outlined by Falk among his "principles of normative restraint."' 4 It was suggested that certain concepts be adopted-the present writer
believes, however, that this could best be accomplished through diplomatic conferences rather than through meetings designed to establish new norms of international
law by the drafting of universal conventions-in order to avoid nuclear conflicts as
well as to oppose all kinds of totalitarian aggression. Among the principles suggested by Falk, one centered on the idea that if internal war occurred in a state which
was a member of one of the world's blocs, the rival bloc should restrict itself rigorously to nonintervention. Another principle was represented by the rule that if
internal war occurred in an uncommitted state, any kind of intervention by one bloc
justified-indeed was said to authorize-nonnuclear intervention by the opposing
bloc: such counter-intervention, let it be emphasized, was to be only of "approximately symmetrical character." The present writer cannot associate himself with
this concept if it is meant to include subversive counter-intervention. He, therefore,
would support such military intervention as is represented by the instances of South
Korea and South Vietnam. He would be opposed to meeting subversion with subversion.
C. Treaty Controls
Many commentators on the issues raised by international subversive propaganda
have concluded that little, if any, in the way of a solution for the problems in question can be found in the conclusion of international agreements prohibiting subFriedmann, supra note 92, at 500.
10 Consult MARTIN, op. ct. supra note 27, at 18o-88.
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versive propaganda of all kinds.'
This view appears justified as long as one thinks
in terms of a universal convention. Such an instrument would most likely stand as
a monument to an utterly futile effort at achieving centralized legal controls, since it
would ignore both the theoretical and the practical policies being pursued by revolutionary as well as by many formerly colonial states. As numerous publicists have
pointed out, any normative treaty, the provisions of which are too advanced for the
state of the world order, ought to be regarded as stillborn, for it would not be
observed.' 08
It has been suggested, however, that realistic standards could be established under
which both national and supranational intervention in internal wars could be regularized.? 7 How this could be achieved without some form of legally binding international agreement of universal scope-the possibility of which is doubted strongly by
the present writer-is not clear. But the idea itself opens some fascinating avenues
for speculation. One suggestion was that the rules as well as the processes of the law
of nations should be adapted through revision to the extralegal conditions prevailing
today. In the first place, it was felt a distinction should be drawn between internal
wars to be treated as purely domestic conflicts, and hence to be withdrawn from
permissible outside interference, and internal wars that had become either an arena
of direct or indirect external aggression or that represented the scene of a struggle
for minimum rights recognized as mandatory by the community of nations. (In this
connection the present writer would like to observe that the existence of such
recognition on an obligatory basis appears most debatable!) Once an internal war
had been classified as falling into the second grouping-a determination apparently intended as the responsibility of a supranational agency, universal or regional in scope-

then the legal norms of nonintervention would be suspended when a "major international actor" violated them. Again, the incumbent government of the state in which

the internal war was taking place would be presumed to be the legitimate government to which aid should be given. Yet if the incumbent administration premised
"its social order upon colonial subordination or upon principles of elite racial
supremacy," the legal norms about nonintervention against that "illegitimate" administration were to be suspended.

Without advocating a reversal of the "retreat of the white man" or supporting
racialism in any form, it is submitted that such proposals violate basic customary and
conventional norms of international law. No rule of that law prohibits the owner-

ship of colonial possessions by a sovereign state, nor does there exist a legal principle in
the law of nations prohibiting domestic discrimination, racial or otherwise, by the
government of a state against groups of its own citizens. To advocate the norms

outlined is to deny the basic principle of state sovereignty, the foundation of interna...See WmHrrrON & LAxsoN 23o.
.00See, e.g., DE VisscHE., op. cit. supra note 95, at 133, on this point.

...Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in INrTaa roA. AspEars or
CIVL SnUaFE 185, 209, 240, 244 (Rosenau ed. x964).
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tional law and of the existing legal order. Even if, "to avoid instability, this certification of illegitimacy must be formally expressed by the United Nations resolutions of
censure that achieve support from the overwhelming majority of Members, including
leaders of both cold war blocs,'1 08 such certification represents, in the opinion of the
present writer, crass interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, clearly
prohibited by the provisions of the Charter itself.
Lastly, the proposals just discussed do not really affect the subversive activities
connected with liberation propaganda. The latter, in its essential stages, precedes the
internal war sparked by it, and hence the foregoing suggestions would apply, in
effect, only after subversive propaganda had accomplished its work.
The one example of multilateral agreement concerned with the control of
subversive propaganda which appears to offer a bit of hope in the long run would
seem to be a revision and re-adoption of the abortive "International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace," of September 23, 1936.100
That instrument, effective in 1938, had been ratified or adhered to by twenty-two
states, including France and the United Kingdom; the Soviet Union, a signatory,
failed to ratify the treaty. Neither the United States nor China signed or acceded.
Limited in scope to dissemination of propaganda by radio, the agreement provided
in articles i through 4 the "repressive" clauses prohibiting within the territories of
the parties all transmissions calculated (by inaccuracy or otherwise) to "constitute an
incitement either to war or to acts likely to lead thereto," to disturb international
understanding, or to incite the population of any territory to acts deemed incompatible with the domestic order or the security of any other contracting party.
Disregarding the limitations of applicability to radio alone, it would appear that
the 1936 instrument defined rather clearly the activities to be controlled as subversive
intervention or subversive propaganda. Nevertheless, should the treaty be renegotiated in the future, it would seem wise to spell out in concise language the sphere of
activity to be regulated, based on the experiences of the years since the Second World

War.lo

As long as effective and universal community control over subversive propaganda
appears unrealizable, it is suggested that a multilateral convention on the model of
the 1936 instrument be developed."' This could be done in several ways. The General Assembly might direct the International Law Commission to undertake the drafting of such an agreement on a top-priority basis, for submission to the members for
suggestions and eventual redrafting prior to opening the instrument for signature.
1o ld. at 243-44109 Text in 32 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 113-20 (1938).
"I Id. at 117-18 [arts. io and 12 (accession); art. 13 (denunciation); art. 14 (application to dependent

territories); arts. x18-xI9 (revision)].
'2' Only Friedmann, Intervention, Civil War, and the Rdle of InternationalLaw, 1965 PROCEmNGs 67,
THE
7o , appears to agree with the present writer on this point, but even he, in WOLFGANG FsUEnrUNzr,
CHANGING StTRuaruaE oF INTErmAToNAL LAw 273 (x964), believes that such a proposal requires prior
adjustments in outlook on the part of both camps in the Cold War.
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Or a special conference on the model of the Geneva Conferences on the Law of the
Sea might be convened. Or, most speedily perhaps, the Political Committee of the
General Assembly might itself do the job of drafting. The proposed agreement
should encompass coverage of all commonly utilized media for the dissemination of
subversive propaganda, including the liberation variety. It should cover, as did the
1936 instrument, both private and public agencies for the dissemination of such propaganda, as long as such private agencies were subject to government regulation or
licensing. It should not include any exemptions based on presumed colonial rule
or racist domestic policies but should emphasize throughout its provisions the sovereign independence of the members of the community of nations and the fundamental
danger to every internal political order represented by attempts to subvert the
allegiance of subjects and citizens.
Lastly, such an instrument should make it very clear in its wording that the
prohibition of subversive propaganda was not to be viewed as an infringement of any
alleged international freedoms of communication and information across national
frontiers. Since such freedoms do not exist as norms of international law, they
would not be violated by the envisaged controls over the dissemination of subversion.
Also, since political propaganda must be viewed (as long as it is authorized, sponsored, or disseminated by governments) as one aspect of foreign relations, of foreign
policy, it should not be involved with domestic freedoms of speech and of the press.
Such an agreement would not be supported by the states of the Communist blocs
nor by a number of the uncommitted countries. It therefore would ab initio fail
to achieve anything approaching universal adherence. But if a sufficient number of
Western and non-Western states could be brought under legal obligation to refrain
from subversive propaganda activities, a consensus of sizable proportions would have
been recorded. Such states as refused to become parties to the proposed prohibitory
instrument would be on notice that subversion was still regarded as a violation of
the norm of nonintervention and that retaliation or reparation, or both, would be
sought. The proposed agreement would, therefore, substitute first of all a detailed
conventional prohibition for the currently encountered highly selective system of
auto-limitation, fluctuating between emphasis on national interest and on customary
law norms. In the second place, reinforcement for the principle of nonintervention
in a vital area of internal legal order would have been laid down through a multilateral convention.
The fact that the proposed agreement would not be universal in scope, at least
not initially, should not matter at all. In fact, it would be necessary to conclude the
agreement on a limited basis for the sake of realism, for to wait until the principal
actors on both sides in the Cold War would be willing to agree on a reduction of
tensions and of propaganda activities through a treaty would simply mean that no
agreement would materialize in the foreseeable future.
How could an agreement such as the one outlined above be provided with the
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teeth necessary for its enforcement? A variety of provisions can be envisaged, any or
all of which might become a part of the proposed general convention on the prohibition of subversive propaganda. Among suggestions meriting examination would
be the lodgment of diplomatic protests (with appropriate documentation) by the
government of a target state with either the Secretary General of the United Nations
or with a special agency created for this purpose within or under the Secretariat of
that organization. There might be an expansion of the United Nations broadcasting
services to publicize the violation of the prohibitory convention, once the Secretary
112
General or the special office had examined the correctness of the charges filed.
While current appropriations for the United Nations Radio Service are niggardly
($216,ooo per year), it is quite conceivable that funds for expanded coverage could
be made available under the stimulus derived by the hoped-for widespread adherence
of members to the proposed convention (once its importance had been effectively made
clear to those members). United Nations broadcasts are said to reach already
107 countries and territories in twenty-seven languages, with a total annual programming of 3,500 hours.113
United Nations broadcasting services in connection with the prohibition on subversive propaganda could be coupled productively with the operations of a worldwide United Nations monitoring service. Such a concept was explored by a number
of individuals, such as Chester Bowles and Salvador Lopez, 114 and most prominently
by former President Eisenhower on August X3, 1958, in his address before the General
Assembly on peace in the Near East: "I believe that this Assembly should ... consider means for monitoring the radio broadcasts directed across national frontiers....
It should then examine complaints from these nations which consider their national
security jeopardized by external propaganda.""' 5 Such a monitoring service, after
recording propaganda broadcasts, could not only supply additional evidence to whatever United Nations agency was selected to deal with the subject, but could, independently of complaints filed by a target state, direct the attention of the Secretary
General or special agency to transmissions of subversive character so that investigation could be undertaken. It is interesting to note in this connection that in February 1964, a special investigative committee of the OAS (Argentina, Colombia, Costa
Rica, the United States, and Paraguay) spent weeks in sifting evidence for the
drafting of a report on Cuban subversive activities. The evidence submitted by
Venezuela included tapes representing one hundred hours of subversive propaganda
broadcasts emanating from Radio Havana and other Cuban stations." 0
In all instances of alleged violation of the prohibitory convention, determination
12

See WmreTON & LmsoN

222-23.

N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1965, p. 17, col. 3.
"I"Consult WmTToN & LASx 184-85.
lir 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 337, 339 (1958); see also Whitton, Radio Propaganda-A Modest Proposal, 52 A-. J. IT'L L. 739 (1958), for an analysis of the monitoring concept.
"' BLAcxsTocx, op. cit. supra note 7, at 25.
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of such violation would have to be surrounded with the normal safeguards found in
the administrative law of Western countries. Assuredly a decision would have to be
analogous to that of a tribunal, not to a political determinationj"7 In fact, a very
desirable feature to be incorporated in the convention would be a detailed set of
regulations for a speedy review procedure, culminating possibly in an appeal to the
International Court of Justice.
Several publicists have noted with approval the concept of a "right of reply" and
the existence of the 1952 "Convention on the International Right of Correction"
(effective as of August 25, 1962, for six states, none of them of major-power status) *18

The present writer believes that machinery for the implementation of a right of reply
or a right of correction might operate with some measure of success in the instances
of defamatory and warmongering propaganda but that the very nature and aims of
subversive propaganda exclude it from effective application of these rights.
Broadcasting, as a major means employed for the dissemination of subversive
propaganda of all kinds, is particularly susceptible to a countermeasure often applied
against such activities, the practice of jamming." 9 This term refers to the setting up
of radio transmitters broadcasting interference on the same frequencies as an offending or competing radio transmission originating across a national frontier. It has been
commonly employed by Iron Curtain countries, despite the considerable expense
20
involved.
International broadcasting is currently governed by the provisions of the 1952
Buenos Aires Telecommunications Convention. Jamming is, in turn, related to
articles 31 and 32 of that treaty. It should be noted that both the Soviet Union and
the United States are parties to the agreement. Under the terms of the Buenos
Aires convention and of other telecommunications agreements, jamming is prima
facie a violation of voluntarily assumed international obligations. On the other hand,
there are two notable exceptions commonly cited in extenuation of the practice of
jamming: a reservation laid down by the Soviet Union at Buenos Aires in 1952 (a
claim to be able to censor any news representing "incitement to aggression, to war,
and to the use of force"),'M and the asserted and undoubted right of a state to selfdefense, even against radio transmissions aimed at its national security and its internal
22
order'
"'\VsrroN & LASON 226-27.
"i Id. at 187-94 for details, and consult the analysis by Whitton, An InternationalRight of Reply, 44
Am. J. INT'L L. 141 (195o).
1z
HYDE, op. cit. supra note x9, at 6o5-17, for background; for more recent developments, consult

MARni, op. it. supra note 27, at 85-88, and WXVsrrToN & LARSON 210-20. See also Note, Government
Exclusion of Foreign Political Propaganda,68 HAsv. L. RIv. 1393 (1955).
""See The Red Network, News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Aug. x953, pp. 56-59; N.Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1950, p. 3, col. 8.
...
WHrrToN & LARSON 219.

.. Ibid., as well as Codding, Jamming and the Protection of Frequency Assignments, 49 Am. J. INT'L
L. 384 (1955). On Nov. 18, 1950, Committee 3 (Social, Humanitarian, Cultural) of the General Assembly,
by a 39 to 5 vote, adopted a resolution condemning jamming of broadcasts. See N.Y. Times, Nov. g,
1950, p. 27, col. 5.
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The present writer believes that any target state for subversive propaganda
possesses a perfect legal right to adopt jamming procedures against foreign subversive
transmissions, as long as a formal protest as well as a formal notice of intention to
institute jamming have been registered with the offending state. It is suggested that,
if suitably small portable, and relatively inexpensive, transmitters for jamming purposes can be developed, a target state might be authorized officially by the United
Nations agency charged with enforcement of the prohibitory convention to adopt
jamming as a means of self-defense.12 3 In addition, a loan of the necessary equipment might be granted to a target state by that United Nations agency as an enforcement measure under the convention. If such equipment could be made available
to the target state against a moderate rental fee, the receipts from such leases could
be utilized both for the acquisition of additional jamming equipment and for the
replacement of such units as would inevitably be lost or ruined in the course of
operations.
In addition to a general (not universal) convention prohibiting subversive propaganda--or in its place, should such an agreement be impossible of achievementregional instruments embodying the concepts outlined above for the general treaty
and implementing the norm of nonintervention should be developed. Regional institutions capable of concluding and enforcing such particular, regional, instruments
-and here the creation of regional international law norms is definitely contemplated by the present writer-abound already: the OAS, the NATO grouping (regardless of the presence or absence of France), the SEATO group of states, and even
the Warsaw Pact states (improbable as their inclusion here may appear at present)
come to mind.
Actual enforcement procedures adopted against the member of a regional grouping and stemming from a charge of disseminating subversive propaganda would not
appear to be in conflict with the frequently invoked article 53 of the United Nations
Charter. That article asserts that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council." Under contemporary conditions, such authorization appears unlikely in a serious case of subversive propaganda undertaken by a permanent member of the Council or by a government befriended by such a permanent member. It
is believed, however, that a regional agency such as the OAS has the legal right to
resort to enforcement measures outside the military sphere, such as economic, diplomatic, or communications activities, against the disseminator of subversive propaganda. As Thomas and others have pointed out," 4 officials of the OAS have accepted
the view, since the passage of the Rio Treaty, that measures falling short of armed
violence can be employed by a regional agency at any time without raising the issue
2"This concept was developed by the present writer before he realized that WMrrroN & LAnSONr 226
contained a similar proposal.
'AN V. THOMAS & A. J. THom s, JR., NoN-INTERVEIrrON: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE
AnmEcs 85-9o, 92-3o2 (1956).
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of a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The use of armed force, on the
other hand, would have to involve an invocation of article 51 of the Charter as well
as of article 3 of the Rio Treaty.
D. Sef-Help as a Form of Control of Subversive Propaganda
The subject of controls of all forms of subversive propaganda cannot be abandoned
without a brief examination of the position occupied by reprisals as related to such
propaganda activities. Reprisals and other varieties of self-help have been held to be
legitimate throughout the history of international law 25 Only in very recent times
has the legal status of these techniques been questioned and, in some cases, been
denied by publicists. The Charter of the United Nations obligates the members
to settle disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force.
On the other hand, it is held that the use of reprisals against another state is not
prohibited, provided force in the military sense is not utilized. Presumably reprisals
involving force would be permissible if undertaken under the authority of a relevant
organ of the United Nations, in accordance with articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.
But what would be the situation if a target state of subversive propaganda adopted
reprisals, even such as involved the use of force, under the guarantee of article 51
of the Charter concerning the right of self-defense, at least until the United Nations
had acted against the alleged aggressors?
The present writer believes that even the use of force would be justified as selfdefense in the case of such a target state, if the danger created by the propaganda in
question had reached the point at which a condition of "clear and present danger"
could be shown to exist.
As far as reprisals short of the employment of force are concerned-as devices to
bring about a cessation of subversive propaganda-a number of concrete possibilities
of implementation come to mind: nonperformance of treaty obligations, governmental promotion of boycotts of the goods of the offending state, freezing of assets of
the latter found in the target state, embargoes on trade with the offending state,
detention of vessels of the offending state (old-style embargo), and so on. In all
instances, however, the acts of reprisal must not be out of proportion to the original
injury suffered or offense given.
Should anyone object to the employment of reprisals, even including military
force, against a state guilty of disseminating subversive propaganda, it can be pointed
out that prohibitions of the unilateral threat to use force or of the use of various
methods of self-help short of war are highly unrealistic. If viewed literally, the
Charter has deprived states of valuable tools formerly used to obtain justice and redress for injuries, without, in practice, substituting a really effective new method for
accomplishing the desired ends. As long as this is the case, traditional methods of
12'
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self-help appear legitimate and may serve as valuable techniques to bring about a
cessation of subversive propaganda.
If a general convention prohibitory of subversive propaganda should materialize,
one of its provisions would have to lay down a requirement that a target state of
subversive propaganda, at the beginning of the employment of any method of selfhelp, would be obligated to report all relevant details to the United Nations agency
charged under the terms of the convention with the enforcement of the instrument.

IV
LEGAL IMPLICATIONs OF CONTROLS OF SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA

A number of significant objections to the concept of legal controls over sub-

versive propaganda have centered on the contention that such controls would violate
asserted freedoms of speech and of information at the national and international
levels. This argument poses a number of interesting issues. In the first place, it
alleges the existence of a conflict between two sets of norms of international law: one
quite definitely prohibiting subversive propaganda as intervention, the other presumably guaranteeing freedom of the flow of information across national frontiers,
coupled with the existence of a freedom to know and to speak.
It cannot be doubted that international communications, by whatever means,
perform two parallel functions. One is to reduce to a minimum the flow and influence of hostile (subversive, and so on) propaganda; the other is to increase to the
greatest possible extent the flow and exchange of information. Since these functions
are inextricably connected, it is unavoidable that one is faced at some point by the
question whether the advantages to be obtained from a reduction, or even suppression,
of hostile propaganda are not perhaps offset by the inevitable restraints and controls
on a free flow of information across frontiers. 26
The present writer believes that many of the arguments centering on this undoubted dilemma are completely irrelevant to the central problem of the control
of subversive propaganda. As long as one deals with the question of government
dissemination of subversion, most arguments based on freedom of information, freedom of speech in the domestic constitutional meaning, and freedom to hear, simply
ignore the issue. They would only re-enter the picture when a discussion of restraints
on private dissemination of propaganda were undertaken. And, as Whitton and
Larson pithily commented, "A sustained propaganda campaign aimed at subversion,

for example, is not corrected by mere freedom of information,' 127 certainly not when
it is a government which undertakes the actual propaganda effort.
Normally, it can be maintained, a government is free to speak its mind, even
across national borders; but there exists even for governments a line beyond which
126 VHiTTON & LAItSON 195.
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their freedom of speech cannot be allowed to go without challenge: subversion of the
internal order of another state is illegal.
Democratic governments, particularly that of the United States, have often
objected strenuously to proposals to institute curbs on the dissemination of subversive
o,the Council of the OAS subpropaganda. Thus, at the Caracas Conference of i95
mitted a draft protocol (as a working document) dealing with controls over propaganda aimed at fomenting internal war; the United States informed the other members that if the proposed key provisions (article VII, on radio propaganda, public
and private) were adopted into a treaty, the United States would be forced to make
a reservation to the article. The American objection stated that "Any attempt to fix
this general policy, however, into specific international treaty obligations and thus to
translate it from the area of policy into the regime of law would, in the view of the
Government of the United States, be fraught with grave dangers to freedom of
speech, sacred in this Hemisphere and to democratic countries everywhere."' 8 This
American interpretation ignored the fact that the United States government was at
least indirectly responsible, through licensing procedures, for private American propaganda activities aimed across national frontiers. Possibly, too, the American objection might never have been voiced if the draft instrument had been limited in its
relevant provisions to governmental propaganda activities.
The prohibitory convention suggested earlier in this investigation should, of
course, not be restricted to "public" propaganda alone, for indirect responsibility for
radio (and television) propaganda by private persons and groups devolves upon
states. Friedmann pointed out recently 12 9 that the creation of a private communications satellite company by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 involved the
United States government in a degree of responsibility, for the statute did specifically
provide for governmental supervision in all activities of the company related to public
international affairs. Thus governmental interference for the sake of public policy
was contemplated and apparently no conflict with freedoms of speech and information was anticipated.
In the realm of public subversive propaganda activities, one cannot seriously maintain that lack of effective (as contrasted with indirect or possible) governmental
controls, or any traditions of free speech, should or could prevent state regulation
in the interest of national policy to prevent dissemination of subversion. Whitton and
Larson emphasized this conclusion with a wealth of relevant backing by responsible
publicists. Thus Cavaglieri asserted as early as 1927 in a report to the Institute of
International Law that "a state cannot tolerate without incurring the gravest international responsibility, the transmission from its territory of messages ... which are addressed to the citizens of any state to incite them to revolt."' 30 In the same year, the
Quoted in Fenwick, Proposed Control Over the Radio as an Inter-American Duty in Cases of Civil
Strife, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 289, 291 ('954).
129 WOLFGANG FRIEDmANN, THE CHANGING STRUTURE or INTERNATIONAL LAW 274 (1964).
IS033-1 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 152 (1927).
128
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Institute declared that state responsibility was created whenever a state did not employ
the means at its disposal to prevent transmissions "which, by their contents, are of a
nature to disturb the public order of another state, when similar emissions have already been called to its attention by the latter."'' And Hyde believed that failure
to fulfill an international obligation resulted from the abstention by a state to employ
the means available to it to prevent the use of radio services to cause injury to another
state by radio transmissions. 3 2 Basically, then, no state can ignore the activities
of radio and other communications media on its territory when those activities impinge on the conduct of foreign relations. If, as a result, a violation of international
law takes place, state responsibility may come into being.
What is the status of the asserted rights of freedom of speech, information, and
so on, that have on occasion been said to stand in the way of effective regulation of
the dissemination of subversive propaganda? In all instances discussed in this section,
it must be kept in mind that there is no direct general obligation on any government
to control or suppress the opinions of private individuals, except in very specific
and rather extreme cases. International responsibility of a direct nature devolves
only on governments, their public acts, and those of certain key officials and agenciesthough, in the case of communications media requiring licensing and other state
controls, an indirect responsibility may develop for the government in the case of
subversive propaganda.
Beginning with the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, a remarkably
extensive yet equally remarkably unproductive series of efforts have been made to
create binding guarantees for freedonis of speech and of information. The very Preamble to the Charter asserted already that the peoples of the United Nations were
determined "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights." While the Preamble
is, of course, an integral part of the Charter which, in turn, must be viewed in many
of its provisions as a nonselfexecuting treaty, the Preamble, by definition, should not
be viewed as setting forth binding obligations for the members of the organization. The present writer cannot agree, therefore, with Svarlien's view that the
183
Preamble must "be regarded as a vital part of the existing law of nations."
On examining the actual Charter provisions, one finds that article i, paragraph 3,
mentions "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms"; article 13 directs the General Assembly to study and make recommendations for the "realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all"; article
55 states that the United Nations are to promote "universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all," while article 56 directs the
Economic and Social Council to make recommendations for the identical purposes
mentioned in the previously cited article. Nowhere, however, are the human rights
and fundamental freedoms spelled out, listed, or defined!
131 33-3 id. at 294.
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There is no need here to outline step by step the ambitious activities initiated
within United Nations agencies soon after 1945 for the purpose of implementing the
vague references listed above for rights and freedoms, such as the efforts of the
General Assembly, of the Economic and Social Council, of the Commission of Human Rights, and of the Geneva Conference of 1948 on Freedom of Information
34
and of the Press.'
The net results of all the meetings consisted of the Convention on International
Right of Correction (adopted by six countries) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, the latter not being a treaty at all. Beyond these, only numberless successive drafts of well-intentioned documents on human rights, rights of
man, freedom of information, and so on were gathered in the files of the United
Nations agencies, victims, at least in part, of the Cold War. And it is interesting to
note that even the most progressive draft instrument, in its regulatory provisions
on controls over dangerous propaganda, only authorized the prospective parties to
suppress such propaganda, rather than obligating them to do so.
In summary, it is felt by the present writer that since the Charter of the United
Nations does not spell out human rights and freedoms related to the control of propaganda, since the one convention adopted does not relate directly to subversive propaganda, and since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ought to be regarded
either as a consensus or, better, as a species of moral preachment not bound up at all
with legal obligations or norms of law, any attempt to regulate subversive propaganda would not conflict with legally established human rights and freedoms of
speech or information. The latter simply do not exist as rights under either customary or conventional international law. It should be noted, moreover, that one
regional instrument dealing, inter alia, with freedom of expression, the Convention

for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on
November 4, I950, and soon thereafter in effect,' 3 5 surrounded the freedom of expression delineated in its article io with a number of specific, adequate, and reasonable safeguards to prevent abuses of the freedom in question.
If, by some miracle not anticipated, the Universal Declaration of 1948 were transformed into conventional law, its present contents could still not be construed as
being in conflict with a regulation of subversive propaganda. The relevant article,
states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
number i9,
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."' 6

It is difficult to disagree with the first part of that noble statement. But when it is
asserted that no restrictions ought to be placed on receiving and imparting information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers, reality has been left
1' For details consult 'vr'rro& LA1so~N 196-2o9.
155 Text in 45 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 24-39 (1951).
113 U.N. GEN. Ass. OrF. Rac. 3d Sess., pt. i, Resolutions 71, 75 (A/81o) (1948).
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behind and Utopia beckons. As has been pointed out repeatedly, subversive propaganda strikes at the very foundations of national political existence, at the loyalty
of the citizens of a state. Under the justified plea of self-defense, any state will
attempt to halt such outside interference, and no asserted "freedoms" can deprive a
sovereign authority of its basic right to seek continuity of its existence. As far as
the wording of article 19 is concerned, a target government would simply assert that
the guarantees given did not cover subversion and treason, applicable though they
might be to other forms of human communication and information. By this simple
declaration, which, the present writer believes, would sooner or later emanate from
all target governments if the instrument in question became a treaty, all conflict between controls and freedoms would be eliminated through a simple, logical, and
reasonable interpretation of an otherwise totally unrealistic statement of freedoms.
The United Nations "Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," skillfully
assembled by Baxter from the mass of relevant drafts, while reiterating the provisions just discussed, realistically continues in paragraph 3 of article 19 to the effect
that
The exercise of the rights provided for... carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall be such
only as are provided by law and are necessary, (i) for respect of the rights or reputations of others, (2) for the protection of national security or of public order
('ordre public'), or of public health and morals. 37
However, the present writer believes that "by law" refers to domestic legislation and
that hence the restrictions envisaged would not prevent a government bent on disseminating subversive liberation propaganda from doing so. And again article 26 of
the same Draft Covenant, suggested by Baxter for placement directly after article
i9,138 in providing that "any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law,"
suffers from the same shortcoming as was evident in the case of article i9: the "law"
appears to be a reference to domestic law only.
More important, as McDougal and Bebr noted, fundamental changes such as
have been contemplated through the adoption of a general (universal) law-making
treaty are seldom achieved quickly and often run counter to the policies of major
powers.139 A dramatic illustration of this truism was supplied in 1953 when the
United States government announced that it did not intend to become a party to any
general treaty of human rights and freedoms. 40
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